The article by Wing et al. (1) introduced the idea of calculating the relative intensity of radioactive fallout between sectors of a circle drawn around the accident at Three Mile Island. The partition derived from wind and weather data allowed a comparison of ratios of radiation exposure between sectors with cancer incidence ratios and bypassed much of the uncertainty involved in calculating actual doses. The results indicated that higher fallout was correlated with higher cancer incidence. Considering that the average levels of radioactivity in each sector were low, this could be interpreted as evidence for a proportional carcinogenic response to low doses of ionizing radiation. There is, however, a simpler way to interpret the same set of data.
Wing et al. (1) At the heart of the matter, it seems to us, is Wing's assertion that our original interpretation is based on circular reasoning. He makes this charge, he says, because we did not believe in the hypothesis under test. The first of two objections to this charge is that it is untrue. We had no such simplistic belief. At the outset, in the light of the uncertainties about the dose of radiation from the 1979 nudear accident, and also of a reported cluster of deaths that conceivably pointed to acceleration of cancers already initiated, we accepted the possibility ofan effect.
At the same time, given the short postaccident observation period and the putatively low dose, we were doubtful that any but the most radiosensitive cancers could be detected. We did not seek, but were sought out, to investigate on behalf of the TMI Public Health Fund. Our acceptance of the considerable undertaking involved was realistic, with no great expectation of startling results. Public duty at a time when fear and unrest beset the affected communities was a strong motive.
This mistaken allegation about our beliefs is much the lesser of our two objections. The greater objection is to Wing's claim that circular reasoning led to failure to prove an a priori hypothesis we allegedly did not believe. To test an a priori hypothesis, which we did, is of course a procedure specifically designed to preclude circularity. More disturbing is the religious cast of mind this charge displays. To make a prior belief a criterion for judging evidence is the very antithesis of any scientific or logical method, from the inductivist Francis Bacon early in the 17th century to the hypothetico-deductive Karl Popper in the 20th. Whatever we do, we must surely aim for a maximum of rigor and objectivity. One is obliged to attempt disproof no less than verification. In striving toward elusive truth, a priori belief is beside the scientific point. Passionate belief, which characterized Wing, may well be a handicap.
An a priori hypothesis subject to test, by contrast, is a considerable asset regardless of belief. Wing's position amounts to a charge that we are either incapable of understanding our data-on that score let our records speak-or that we obfuscate or lie. In your news report (5) Wing's more specific case against our report rests mainly on two particular issues, namely, his use of relative rather than absolute dose and the adjustments he made for baseline conditions. Let us take these in turn.
Wing makes much of his use of relative dose as "an alternative logical approach" and seems to reproach us on this score [see Wing et al. (2), page 53, second and third columns]. Although they later note that we in fact used relative dose, in remarks to the press (5) we are again reproved. So we must make clear that all our major analyses and results in fact derived precisely from the use of relative dose.
Relative dose is not an exact or complete description ofwhat we did. In a major and labor-intensive effort, one of us U.
Beyea) carried out detailed topographic and meteorologic mapping of the area to model estimates of the direction and concentration of radiation emissions from the accident, from routine operations of the plant, and from background radiation. To our knowledge, ours was a unique approach to deriving exposure measures in the face of uncertain actual dose. We also divided the local area at risk into 69 census-derived
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